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SECTION 6104(d) OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES: THE VALIDITY AND EFFECT
OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
PROPERTY AND PROBATE LAW REFORM
LEONARD LEVINI
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1947, PENNSYLVANIA PROSPECTIVELY SUBSTITUTED a
statutory Rule Against Perpetuities for the common law version.'
Under the statutory rule, an interest is no longer invalid because of a
mere possibility that it might vest beyond the permissible period of a
life or lives in being plus twenty-one years. 2 Instead, a remote
executory or contingent interest is only invalid if it actually fails to
vest at the termination of the permissible period.3
In 1978, the Pennsylvania legislature added section 6104(d) to
the Pennsylvania Probate Code, thereby making the statutory rule
applicable to interests "heretofore created." 4  Although section
6104(d) purports to apply to all interests "heretofore created" without
limitation, it seems likely that the statute can and should reach no
f Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.S., University of Pennsylvania,
1950; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1950. The author wishes to thank Barbara A. Schneller
for her research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. The classic statement of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities was set forth by
John Chipman Gray. It provides: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." J. GRAY, THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
In 1947, the Pennsylvania legislature statutorily adopted the rule but incorporated the
"wait and see" doctrine. Estates Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 39, § 4, 1947 Pa. Laws 103-04
(codified at 20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (Purdon 1976)). For an explanation of the "wait and
see" doctrine, see Martin Estate, 365 Pa. 280, 74 A.2d 120 (1950); text accompanying notes 2-3
infra; note 84 infra. For a comparison of the treatment of a distribution under the common law
and statutory rules, see Pearson Estate, 442 Pa. 172, 275 A.2d 336 (1971).
2. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (Purdon 1976).
3. Id.
4. Estates Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 37, § 4, 1978 Pa. Laws 81 (codified at 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(d) (Purdon Supp. 1978)). The amendment provides in pertinent
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further back than to those estates which have not yet been com-
pletely distributed to the intended beneficiaries because they are still
in the course of administration by the Orphans' Court.5 The statute
should not, however, have any retroactive effect on distributions
which have already been made pursuant to a court's adjudication. 6
Nevertheless, even when construed with this limitation, the pro-
vision still appears to represent a substantial break with traditional
doctrine. The property interest which passes to the residuary legatees
or intestate heirs as a reversionary right upon the failure of an in-
terest under the Rule Against Perpetuities has been generally as-
sumed to be a vested interest 7 which cannot be constitutionally im-
paired by the legislature. 8 By making Pennsylvania's statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities retroactive, section 6104(d) affects existing in-
terests. It preserves some interests which would have failed under
the common law rule and, thus, prevents the accrual of property
rights to the residuary legatees or intestate heirs who would other-
wise possess reversionary rights.
The adoption of this new provision, along with the heightened
interest in probate and related property law reform stimulated by de-
velopments such as the Uniform Probate Code, 9 evinces the need to
reevaluate the wisdom and validity of making reform apply to in-
terests already in existence. Part II of this article will examine the
doctrines developed by the courts to determine whether a rule may
be applied retroactively, and the extent to which these doctrines do
or do not establish a working criterion. Based on this reevaluation of
such doctrines, Part III will suggest a simplified alternate basis for
dealing with the problem of whether probate and related property
law reform should be given retroactive effect.
In particular, Part III will explore, in the context of the 1978
amendment to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 10 the seemingly irrecon-
cilable considerations involved in deciding whether to achieve a
single regulatory system immediately through the retroactive applica-
tion of a new statute, or whether to respect preexisting relationships
5. Where distribution has not been completed, the adjudication remains subject to modifi-
cation, and the allocation of the property of the estate may validly be affected by the statute.
See In re Estate of DeRoy, 481 Pa. 403, 392 A.2d 1355 (1978) (holding that a ruling of the
Orphan's 'Court relating to distribution of a portion of a trust is not binding on a later adjudica-
tion relating to a different portion of the same trust).
6. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3533 (Purdon 1976); notes 82-84 and accompanying text
infra.
7. See Leach, Perpetuities In A Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 647 (1938).
8. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text infra.
9. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, reprinted in 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 287 (1972).
10. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(d) (Purdon Supp. 1978). See note 4 and accompanying
text supra.
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by allowing only a prospective application. Obviously there is a strong
policy in favor of having a single regulatory system applied to all es-
tates. Exclusion of preexisting rights defers a reform for a generation
or longer." Furthermore, in the intervening period, the state pro-
bate rules might become more complex by virtue of "time layering,"
which means that different sets of principles would be applicable to
identical transactions depending upon the effective time selected for
choice of law. 12 On the other hand, the recognition of preexisting
relationships, and the continuation of prior law with respect thereto,
is not simply based on judicial timidity or legislative conservatism.
Rather, it represents a reaction to a very real and practical problem.
Given a free society in which the institution of private property is
accepted, a certain continuity in the law governing rights accruing
from property ownership is corollary. The absence of such continuity
would deprive the affected property interest of any constitutional pro-
tection of substance and would prevent a person from making long-
range plans for fear that "the rules of the game" might be materially
altered after he has changed his position.' 3 Thus, Part III of this
article will examine the extent to which it is appropriate to consider
the tendency of individuals to rely on maintenance of the legal status
quo (the reliance interest).
II. CONVENTIONAL DISTINCTIONS IN APPLYING PROBATE
AND PROPERTY LAW REFORM RETROACTIVELY
A. Constitutional Limitations
At the outset, the constitutional boundaries must be established.
The United States Supreme Court has never definitively ruled that
11. See Morton Estate, 454 Pa. 385, 312 A.2d 26 (1973) (although decided in 1973, this case
was governed by rules repealed prospectively by the legislature 25 years before in 1948).
12. See Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961). The Catherwood court was faced
with an "apportionment morass" in which any one of three statutes could arguably be applied in
apportioning a trust, the choice of law depending upon the date of creation of the trust. Id. at
70-71, 173 A.2d at 90. Holding that "[t]here is no vested property rights [sic] in a court-made
rule of apportionment," the court ordered that the most recent statute be applied to all future
audits, thus allowing a retrospective application to a trust previously created. Id. at 77-78, 173
A.2d at 93.
13. See, e.g., Tafel Estate, 449 Pa. 442, 296 A.2d 797 (1972) (decision may have frustrated
testator's intent by changing the presumption in will construction that "children" meant only
natural children to the presumption that "children" included adopted children). In his dissent in
Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950), Chief Justice Vanderbilt expressed the problem
well when he stated:
The courts have been reluctant to overthrow established rules when property rights are
involved for the simple reason that persons in arranging their affairs have relied upon the
rules as established, though outmoded or erroneous, and so to abandon them would result
sometimes in greater harm than to observe them.
Id. at 25, 76 A.2d at 883-84 (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting).
1979-19801
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changes in the substantive rules of property are per se invalid when
applied to an existing interest.' 4  While acknowledging that a rule
which "takes property from A and gives it to B" might violate due
process, 15 the Court has nevertheless suggested that states do retain
the power to alter existing property rights where a sufficient public
interest exists. 16 Dicta in several decisions of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, on the other hand, recognize that the preservation of an
existing property interest represents a fundamental right protected
by the Pennsylvania and the United States constitutions. 17  The
Pennsylvania courts have maintained that the legislature may not sub-
stantially affect a vested property interest, 18 holding, for example,
that the legislature cannot alter the estate of a person who has already
died or a trust which has been previously funded. 19
14. See Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1944); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 88 (1834); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In both Watson and Calder, cases
decided prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
the Supreme Court upheld the retroactive application of statutes which affected preexisting
property rights. The Watson Court stated:
[Tihis court has no right to pronounce an act of the state legislature void, as contrary to
the constitution of the United States, from the mere fact that it divests antecedent vested
rights of property. The constitution of the United States does not prohibit the states from
passing retrospective laws generally; but only ex post facto laws.
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 110. The enactment of the fourteenth amendment did little to bring about
clarification of this issue, for the Supreme Court was even more equivocal in Chase, where it
held:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of state legislation void merely because
it has some retrospective operation. What it does forbid is taking of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law. Some rules of law probably could not be changed ret-
roactively without hardship and oppression, and this whether wise or unwise in their
origin.
325 U.S. at 315. See generally Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Princi-
ple ofJurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936).
15. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
16. See Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1944); note 14 supra. See also
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
17. See, e.g., Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947);
Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 A. 450 (1871). The Palairet court expressed this principle well
when applying it to the effect of retrospective legislation:
Retrospective legislation is certainly not in itself unconstitutional, unless so far as it
has an effect prohibited by the fundamental law. If, however, an Act of Assembly,
whether general or special, public or private, operates retrospectively to take what is, by
existing law, the property of one man, and without his consent, transfer it to another,
with or without compensation, it is in violation of that clause in the Bill of Rights, Const.,
Art. IX, sect. 9, which declares that no man "can be deprived of his life, liberty or
property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."
Id. at 485, 5 A. at 452.
18. Christner v. Christner, 366 Pa. 41, 76 A.2d 361 (1950); Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947); Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 A. 450 (1871); Heilig
Trust, 29 Pa. Fiduc. 265 (C.P. Phila. 1979).
19. See, e.g., Reznor Estate, 419 Pa. 188, 213 A.2d 791 (1965) (the Pennsylvania Principal
and Income Act of 1947, Puh. L. No. 516, 1947 Pa. Laws 1283, did not apply to distributions
from a trust made prior to the statute's enactment because the right to the income vested upon
distribution). In the case of Henry Estate, 413 Pa. 478, 198 A.2d 585 (1964), the Pennsylvania
4
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B. Retroactive Application of Adjudicative Reform
In dealing with the problem of retroactive change in probate law,
the courts have traditionally found it to be easier to apply the reform
to a preexisting state of affairs where the reform was the product of a
judicial decision rather than a legislative change. The distinction is
based on the juridical theory which maintains that when a court
changes a rule by its own decree, the court is deemed to be declaring
what the law has always been: prior courts simply failed to recognize
it. 20 Hence, theoretically, no direct retroactive effect is involved in a
judicial change of heart. Yet, the practical result of such a change is
that the newly perceived law will be applied in all cases from the
date the court "discovered its error" forward, regardless of when the
rights involved accrued. 21 It is nevertheless true that many courts
see through this theoretical sophistry and, thus, are reluctant to make
any change at all because of its possible retroactive effect. 22 This
produces judicial paralysis.
The theory which views "the law" as distinct from the court's
perception of it, appears to be losing favor with many modern courts
because of its practical retroactive effect.2 3 These courts are anxious
to reform what they regard as a bad decision of law without having to
bear the onus of destroying the rights of those who may have relied
Supreme Court stated: "One possessed of testamentary capacity, who makes a will in Pennsyl-
vania, may die with the justifiable conviction that the courts will see to it that his dispositions,
legally made, are not departed from ...or improperly defeated .. " Id. at 484, 198 A.2d at
588, quoting Brown Estate, 408 Pa. 214, 228-29, 183 A.2d 307, 314 (1962).
20. See Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 535 (1977) (discussing the myth that judges discover rather than create
the law). The traditional view of a change in law by judicial fiat was that the court was merely
correcting erroneous prior decisions: the court, "rather than being the creator of the law was
but its discoverer." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965) (citation omitted) (dictum).
Therefore, the court would apply the correct new rule in all subsequent cases regardless of
whether the factual events being litigated occurred before or after the new rule was instituted.
Id. at 625-26. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966).
21. See Traynor, supra note 20, at 534 ("judicial decisions ...operate retroactively as well
as prospectively").
22. See Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950). In Fox, the court applied a long
standing rule of construction to a will which resulted in frustrating the apparent intent of the
testatrix. The majority explained:
Appellants ask this Court to explicitly and expressly overrule the long established law of
this State. This we decline to do. Such action would be fraught with great danger in this
type of case where titles to property, held by bequests and devises, are involved. A
change of the established law by judicial decision is retrospective. It makes the law at the
time of prior decisions as it is declared in the last decision, as to all transactions that can
be reached by it.
Id. at 14, 76 A.2d at 877-78.
23. See Traynor, supra note 20, at 535.
5
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upon the prior law. 2 4  Several courts have indicated that a judicial
change can play as much havoc with a vested right as a legislative
amendment can. 25 Thus, more than one decision has been made in
which a court let stand what it regarded as a bad rule rather than risk
disappointing the expectations of those who had relied upon it. 26  In
addition, spurred by the example of the United States Supreme
Court in dealing with issues of criminal procedure, 27 a few courts
have begun to control the effect of their decision so as to protect the
rights of those who may have relied upon the prior state of' the
law. 28  In other words, it has been recognized that just as the legisla-
ture may create a change effective only after a specified date, a simi-
lar power exists for judicial rule changes. Consider, fbr example, the
opinion of' a lower Pennsylvania court in Heilig Trust.29 In Heilig,
the plaintiffs decedent had purchased a remainder interest from an
heir whose testator had made charitable bequests within thirty days
of his death. 30 Before the Heilig court's decision, but after the
purchaser had changed his position, a provision in the probate code
prohibiting gifts to charities made within thirty days of death was
24. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1384 (1966).
The Linkletter Court stated that whether an overruling decision will he given retroactive effect
"depends upon a consideration of 'particular relations . . . and particular conduct . . . of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality'; and
'of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application.' "
381 U.S. at 627, quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374
(1940) (citation omitted). The Court concluded that "the accepted rule today is that in appro-
priate cases the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective." id. at 628. See
also Traynor, supra note 20, at 541-42.
25. See, e.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); State
v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910); Phillips Exeter Academy v. Gleason, 102 N.H.
369, 157 A.2d 769 (1960); State ex rel. Washington State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d
645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963); Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Wisconsin i)ept. of Taxation, 260 \Vis.
551, 51 N.W.2d 796 (1952).
26. See, e.g., Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950) (allowing the language of a will to
control and therefore voiding a "gift over," despite the apparent intent of testatrix to create a
life estate and remainder); see note 22 supra; cf. Heilig Trust, 29 Pa. Fiduc. 265 (C.P. Phila.
1979) (allowing only prospective application of a previous decision, which had declared a statute
to be unconstitutional, so as not to defeat the interests of one who had relied on the statute).
27. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (refiusing retroactive application of
the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966)); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972)
(refusing retroactive application of the "critical stage" rule of Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970)); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (refusing retroactive application of the
exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
28. See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) (allowing only a pro-
spective application of a new measure of damages rule in survival actions); Moltrup Estate, 424
Pa. 161, 225 A.2d 676 (1967) (denying the application of a rule of will construction, changed in
an earlier case, to the will of a testator who bad died hefore that case was decided); Heilig
Trust, 29 Pa. Fiduc. 265 (C.P. Phila. 1979) (previous decision which had declared a statute
unconstitutional would not he applied to defeat the interest of one who had relied on the stat-
ute). See also note 24 supra.
29. 29 Pa. Fiduc. 265 (C.P. Phila. 1979).
30. Id. at 277.
[VOL. 25: p. 213
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found to be unconstitutional. 3l  The court held that the holding of
unconstitutionality should not be applied to upset the rights of the
purchaser of an heir's reversionary interest upon proof' that the
purchaser had relied upon the facial invalidity of such a charitable
gift. 32
C. Retroactive Application of Statutory Reform
When the change in probate-related law is legislative, as in the
case of section 6104(d), the problem is considerably more complex. In
evaluating the applicability of the statute to a preexisting interest, a
court faces a dual problem. It will have to determine first, as a matter
of statutory construction, whether or not the statute was intended to
apply to preexisting interests, and second, whether such application is
violative of either the state or federal constitution.
Where the statute specifies an effective date and makes clear what
event will trigger its application, little problem exists for judicial ap-
plication of the act. Thus, it is common for a new probate code to
provide that it will apply to the estates of persons dying after the
effective date of the act.33  For an interim period, while a court is in
the process of settling both the estates of persons who died before,
and the estates of those who died after, the effective date of the stat-
ute, the court will necessarily be administering two sets of rules at
the same time with the choice of the applicable rule depending upon
the date of the decedent's death.
3 4
Where no effective date is set forth in the statute, a court must
determine whether or not the statute can and should be applied to
particular fact situations. In this instance, courts frequently state that
there is a presumption against the retroactive application of a stat-
31. Cavill Estate, 459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 (1974).
32. Heilig Trust, 29 Pa. Fiduc. 265, 279-80 (C.P. Phila. 1979).
33. See Spain's Estate, 327 Pa. 226, 193 A. 262 (1937); Ryan Estate, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 41,
aff'd per curiam, 404 Pa. 230, 171 A.2d 762 (1961). The Spain court faced the problem of
reconciling the Wills Act of 1917 with an amendment thereto. The Wills Act of 1917 provided:
"This act shall take effect on the thirty-first day of' December, one thousand nine hundred and
seventeen, and shall apply to the wills of all persons dying on or after said day." Wills Act of
1917, Pub. L. No. 190, § 26, 1917 Pa. Laws 403, 412 (current version at 20 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 2507 (Purdon 1976)). The Act of July 2, 1935 amended the Wills Act of 1917 and
provided that the amendment would "become effective immediately upon [the amendment's]
final enactment." Act of July 2, 1935, Pub. L. No. 208, § 2, 1935 Pa. Laws 573. In construing
these two provisions together, the Spain court held that the original act would apply to all wills
where the testator (lied between December 31, 1917 and July 2, 1935, but that the amended
act would apply to the wills of all testators who died thereafter. 327 Pa. at 229, 193 A. at 263.
In Ryan the court stated: "[w]here a will becomes operational after the effective date of
the 1947 Estates Act, the provisions of the will are subject to the application of the act . 24
Pa. D. & C.2d at 49.
34. See Spain's Estate, 327 Pa. 226, 193 A. 262 (1937); note 33 supra.
1979-1980]
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ute,3 5 a presumption that occasionally has been given legislative
sanction.3 6  Furthermore, some states specifically forbid retroactive
legislation in their constitutions.
37
D. Problems of Characterization
In dealing with all of these problems, an initial question of
characterization arises, for it is not always immediately apparent
whether a statute can be regarded as retroactive. Clearly, when a
testator executes his will, he does so with reference to the rules in
effect at that time. Nevertheless, it is universally accepted that so
long as the will remains ambulatory-i.e., so long as the testator is
still alive - there is no inhibition to the alteration of' the law which
would affect the validity of such a will."8 Likewise, there is no un-
fairness in changing the law regarding intestate rights and the right of
surviving spouses arising by operation of' law when the change is e[-
fected during the lifetime of the decedent.
3 9
Somewhat more difficult questions are raised when an interest
created by a will substitute is involved, or where the change in the
law admittedly occurred after the testator's death. In deciding upon
the propriety of retroactivity under these circumstances, the question
arises whether the appropriate time of reference is the date of the
creation of the interest out of which the rights arise, or the date of
the "triggering event" by which the beneficiary's affiected right ac-
35. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 51 Cal. App. 3d 783, 788, 124
Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1975) ("Absent contrary indication in a statute, it is presumably intended to
operate prospectively and not retroactively").
36. See, e.g., I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1926 (Puirdon 1976).
37. COLO. CONST. art. !1, § 11; LA. CONST. art. 4, § 15; Mo. CONsT. art. 1, § 13; N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 23; 01110 CONST. art. II, § 28; TENN. CONsr. art. 1, § 20; TEX. CONST. art.
1, § 16.
38. See Spain's Estate, 327 Pa. 226, 193 A. 262 (1937) (amendment to the Wills Act, abolish-
ing the requirement of subscribing witnesses in order to make a valid charitable bequest,
applied tou the will uuf a person dying after the effective date of the Act, even though the will was
executed prior to that (late).
It should be noted, however, that occasionally a problem of interpretation may remain as to
whether the statute was intended to reach wills executed prior to the statute's enactment where
the testator died after the effective date of the act. Depending upon the eflct of the statute and
whether the statutory language will so permit, there is authority for construing statutory
changes as not having been intended to apply to a previously executed will. See Annot., III
A.L.R. 910, 915 (1937). Generally, "statutes prescribing, and augmenting existing, formalities in
the execution of wills, have not been so applied as to invalidate wills which were validly exe-
cuted miuler the law in force when the execution occurred.' Id. See, e.g., Packer v. Packer, 179
Pa. 580, 36 A. 344 (1897).
39. See Scaifi, y. McKee, 298 Pa. 33, 148 A. 37 (1929) (holding that the Intestate Act of
1917, Pub. L. No. 192, § 4, 1917 Pa. Laws 429, 434, destroys a husband's right ofcurtesy only
in cases where the wifi, dies after the effective date of the Act, hut not where she (lies before
such date).
8
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crues. Even within a particular jurisdiction, such as Pennsylvania,
there is no one, clear-cut answer to the foregoing question.
In the case of a tenancy by the entireties, for example, Pennsyl-
vania courts have held that when the property right vests before the
enactment of the statute, the legislature cannot create a right to parti-
tion upon divorce, even though the divorce, as the triggering event,
occurs after the legislative change. 40  Similarly, a statute intended to
create a system of' community property for married persons which
would have applied to existing property interests was invalidated in
Pennsylvania. 41 With respect to this decision, it is noteworthy that
the attempted merger of' the spouses' separately owned property in-
terests into community property was to occur immediately upon the
passage of the statute. 42  The change in ownership was not delayed
until the occurrence of a triggering event, such as divorce or the
death of either party. 43  Hence, there is at least an argument for
characterizing the statute as an attempt to make an immediate change
in the character of preexisting ownership. A different case would be
presented by the invalidation of a statute intended to create a right of
partition between tenants by the entireties of preexisting estates only
when they thereafter obtain a divorce. In such a situation, there
would be no change in status at all until the triggering event of di-
vorce. Thus, as long as the divorce occurs after the statute's adoption,
it is arguable that the statute would not be operating retroactively at
all, but would simply be regulating the effect of a subsequent divorce
between tenants by the entireties.
One very early case, Bambaugh v. Bambaugh,44 seems to sup-
port such a distinction. In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that it was proper to apply a statute eliminating the right of
survivorship to a joint estate which had been created before the stat-
ute was adopted as long as both joint tenants were alive at the time
40. See Christner v. Christner, 366 Pa. 41, 76 A.2d 361 (1950); Mertz v. Mertz, 139 Pa.
Super. Ct. 299, 11 A.2d 514 (1939).
41. Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947). Parenthetically,
it should le noted that when a change in California's community property law was legislated to
apply to preexisting interests, the California Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the
Pennsylvania courts and sustained the change under the state's general police power. Bouquet
v. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976). The court upheld the
retroactive application of the amended statute, maintaining that "the state's interest in the
equitable dissolution of the marital relationship supports this use of the police power to abrogate
rights in marital property derived from the patently unfair former law." Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at
1378, 128 Cal, Rptr. at 434.
42. Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 588, 55 A.2d 521, 525 (1947).
43. id.
44. 11 Serg. & Rawl. 190, 191-92 (Pa. 1824).
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of its adoption.45 Two of the court's conclusions enabled it to avoid
the issue of the validity of legislation whose retroactivity affects vested
rights: first, the court's analysis characterized the inchoate right of
survivorship as being other than a vested right or interest; and sec-
ond, by selecting the death of the first joint tenant -the event which
would trigger the right of survivorship - rather than the creation of
the joint estate as the time for determining retroactivity, the court
ensured that the statute would have no retroactive effect.
46
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held, in its
more recent decisions, that a change in the rules of apportionment of
income and principal between a life tenant and a remainderman may
properly be applied to a trust created before the effective date of the
change so long as the event triggering apportionment (apportionable
event) occurred afterwards. 47  Under these circumstances, the appli-
cation of the change could le regarded as only prospective in na-
ture: 48 the theory being that the new rule merely changed the defini-
tion and the method of. ascertaining income, and therefore, affected
only those apportionments which occurred after the change in the
rule.
Based upon this rationale, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
indicated that no one has a vested right or interest in the continued
application of a legal principle. 49 While a literal interpretation of this
doctrine might eliminate any bar to retroactive change by either the
legislature or the judiciary, it appears that the principle is employed
by the courts only where the triggering event is one occurring after
the change in the law takes place. 50 Thus, it is only when the appor-
tionable event occurs after the legislative change in the rules of ap-
portionent that the Pennsylvania courts have applied the changed
rules of apportionment to preexisting trusts.51  Moreover, in at least
45. id.
46. 1d. at 191-92.
47. Arrott Estate, 421 Pa. 275, 217 A.2d 741 (1966); Norvell Estate, 415 Pa. 427, 203 A.2d
538 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965); Pew Trust, 411 Pa. 96, 191 A.2d 399 (1963);
Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
48. Norvell Estate, 415 Pa. 427, 203 A.2d 538 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965);
Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
49. Norvell Estate, 415 Pa. 427, 433, 203 A.2d 538, 542 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913
(1965); Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 77, 173 A.2d 86, 93 (1961).
50. See text accompanying notes 40-48 supra.
51. See cases cited note 47 supra. Compare Norvell Estate, 415 Pa. 427, 203 A.2d 538
(1964), cer-t. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965) and Catherwood Tnst, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961)
(applying the Principal and Income Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 516, 1947 Pa. Laws 1283, to all
trusts coming before the court, as long as the apportionable event occurred after the Cather-
wood decision, whether the trust was created before or after the Act was passed) with Reznor
Estate, 419 Pa. 188, 213 A.2d 791 (1965) (denying application of the Principal and Income Act
of 1947, Pub. L. No. 516, 1947 Pa. Laws 1283, to distributions which should have been made
prior to the passage of the Act).
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one decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to apply the
statutory reform to an apportionment problem when the case arose
after the statutory change had taken place, but where the apportion-
able event had occurred before the statutory change.
5 2
Once it has been determined that a rule was intended to operate
retroactively, it has traditionally been said, although not without
some disagreement, 53 that it cannot interfere with or divest any
vested property right.54 In actual practice, however, this prohibition
has not been helpful either to provide, or to predict, the solution to
retroactivity problems. Rather, it appears that many courts assume
the answer first and then apply the principle in a manner consistent
with that answer. For example, it has always been said that even
when constitutional protections apply with respect to retroactive legis-
lation,55 these safeguards are applicable to substantive rights only.56
Hence, if the rule in question can be categorized as merely pro-
cedural, it may be altered by the legislature at will, subject to the
requirements of due process. 5 7  This conclusion is based on the pre-
mise that no person can have a vested right in a given manner of
proceeding.5 8 Thus, generally speaking, a statute of limitations for
an existing cause of action can be altered as long as a reasonable
period of time remains after the change has been made to permit the
52. Reznor Estate, 419 Pa. 188, 213 A.2d 791 (1965). See note 51 supra.
53. Bouquet v. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976). The
Bouquet court noted: "The vesting of property rights, consequently, does not render them
immutable: 'Vested rights, of course, may be impaired "with due process of law" under many
circumstances. " Id. at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432 (footnote omitted), quoting
Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 566, 399 P.2d 897, 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102, quoting
Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in Community Property Control - Rule of
Property or Constitutional Necessity?, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 476, 495 (1945) (footnote omitted).
54. Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947). See notes 41-43
and accompanying text supra. See also Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556, 149
N.W.2d 789 (1967) (allowing retroactive application of a statute which altered the measure of
damages in wrongful death actions, by distinguishing between a substantive law which creates,
defines, and regulates rights, versus a remedial law which prescribes the method of enforcing
the right or obtaining redress for its invasion).
55. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
56. Schultz v. Gosselink, 260 Iowa 115, 148 N.W.2d 434 (1967). The Schultz court stated:
[I]t is a general rule all statutes are to be construed as having a prospective operation only
unless the purpose and intent of the legislature to give it retroactive effect is clearly
expressed in the act or necessarily implied therefrom. The rule is subject to an exception
where the statute relates to remedies and modes of procedure. If a statute relates to a
substantive right, it ordinarily applies prospectively only. If it relates to remedy or proce-
dure, it ordinarily applies both prospectively and retrospectively.
Id. at 117-18, 148 N.W.2d at 435-36 (citations omitted).
57. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1930); Ocha v.
Hernandez Y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 153-54 (1913). See also Traynor, supra note 20, at 533.
58. See Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 563 (1967);
Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71 (1949); Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1922).
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action to be brought.5 9  The principle, however, easily becomes a
tautology since labeling the rule as procedural or substantive deter-
mines the outcome.
Moreover, courts have experienced difficulty in attempting to
distinguish between substantive and procedural changes. For exam-
ple, several states, in an effort to clear land titles, have adopted stat-
utes which purport to limit the time within which a possibility of
reverter can be enforced. 6 ° Such a statute cannot have the desired
effect unless it can be made applicable to a preexisting possibility of
reverter. Is such a change merely procedural since the possibility of
reverter is not instantly extinguished but becomes void only after it
fails to ripen within the prescribed period of time? Or, is the change
substantive because the right of enforcement will never arise if the
condition fails to occur within the prescribed period? As may be ex-
pected, courts do not agree on this issue. 6'
Nevertheless, even if a rule is substantive, traditional concepts
do not preclude the legislature from amending it retroactively unless
the property right being affected can be properly characterized as
"vested." Again, attempts to define a vested right or interest have
found the meaning to be extremely elusive. 62 In one sense, the
problem may be viewed as simply another manner of stating the
question previously discussed: that of determining whether or not the
rule does, in fact, operate retroactively. Although it would seem clear
59. See Ocha v. Hernandez Y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 153-54 (1913). See also Brown v.
Robinson, 117 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1960); Presbytery of Southwest Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232
(Iowa), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
60. See, e.g., FLA. S'rAT. ANN. § 689.18 (West 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.24 (West
Supp. 1979-1980). For a discussion of statutes of this type and related case law, see Annot., 87
A.L.R.3d 1011 (1978). See also note 61 infra.
61. Compare Presbytery of Southwest Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 830 (1975) (requirement of filing notice of reversionary interest in order to extend
enforceability of claim merely modifies the procedure for effecting a remedy and does not un-
constitutionally destroy any vested rights) with Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727
(Fla. 1954) (statute which required holder of a possibility of reverter to institute suit to establish
or enforce such right within one year of the date of enactment is unconstitutional because it
impairs obligations of contracts).
62. For an illustration of this uncertainty, consider the following definition of "vested":
In one sense the word "vested" is defined as meaning accrued; fixed, settled, absolute,
having the character or giving the rights of absolute ownership not contingent, not subject
to be defeated by a condition precedent; not subject to a condition precedent. However,
the word is often used in a different sense from its technical or strictly legal meaning;
'thus vested" has been construed to mean not subject to be divested or indefeasi-
ble.... When the word "vested" is used as descriptive of recognized legal rights, it does
not exclude divestible rights or interests, and it is eImployed to denote the quality of a
present right or interest, even though divestible, as distinguished from the very existence
of which is contingent.
92 C.J.S. Vest at 1003-04 (1955) (footnotes omitted).
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that the right of a prospective heir or distributee to share in the es-
tate of a person still alive is not a vested one, 63 attempts to define
"vested" in other contexts are fraught with uncertainty.
Should the historical distinctions between a vested interest on
the one hand, and a contingent or executory interest on the other, be
maintained for the purpose of deciding whether a change in law
applies retroactively? It has been stated that where an interest follow-
ing a life estate must fulfill a condition precedent to take effect (as
distinguished from its divestiture by a condition subsequent), it should
be treated as a contingent remainder in contradistinction to a vested
remainder. 64  So, too, where a future interest is subject to a condi-
tion precedent but does not directly follow a life estate, it has been
historically denominated an executory interest rather than a vested
one. 65 The distinction between the vested right and the contingent
or executory one has served many useful purposes. For example, it
has been used to determine how to distribute income which accrues
before the time fixed for the interest's enjoyment in the absence of
controlling directions in the instrument. 66 Likewise, the determina-
tion of whether a future interest is vested or contingent may be con-
clusive of the property's disposition where the condition which would
trigger enjoyment fails by reason of impossibility or illegality. 67 This
determination is also the criterion for deciding whether an interest is
subject to, and in fact violates, the Rule Against Perpetuities. 68
It is questionable, however, whether this distinction should be
employed in determining the degree of protection that a property
interest should receive against a legislative or judicial change of rule.
While most American courts treat the reverter as a reversionary in-
terest and, therefore, as vested for purposes of the Rule Against Per-
63. See Spain's Estate, 327 Pa. 226, 233, 193 A. 262, 265 (1937); notes 33 & 38 and accom-
panying text supra. For a collection of cases applying the rule of law in effect at the time the
will was executed, and others applying the rule of law in effect at the death of the testator, see
Annot., 111 AL.R. 910 (1937).
64. L. SINIES, LAW OF FUTURES INTERESTS 20 (2d ed. 1966).
65. Id. at 11.
66. See Edwards v. Hammond, [19361 A.C. 290 (devise to son, conditional upon his reach-
ing age 21, which was distributed to son at age 17, subject to defeasance if he died before
reaching 21).
67. See Ross v. Drake, 37 Pa. 373 (1860). In Ross, the testator had made a bequest to his
son for life, remainder to the son's surviving children and their heirs. 1d. at 373-74. The court
held that the remainder had vested at the testator's death so that the death of the son's daugh-
ter after testator's death, but prior to the son's death, did not result in the disinheritance of the
daughter's child. Id. at 376.
68. See Kountz's Estate (No. 1), 213 Pa. 390, 62 A. 1103 (1906) (remainder to a class subject
to two conditions precedent is contingent and the period fixed by the will for the remainder to
vest is too remote; consequently, the remainder violates the Rule Against Perpetuities). By
definition, the Rule Against Perpetuities does not affect vested interests. See note 1 supra.
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petuities,6 9 it does not necessarily follow that a reversionary interest,
which may not evolve into a possessory interest, is somehow entitled
to greater constitutional protection than an executory interest, which
is subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. 70 As previously noted, 7
1
courts are not in agreement on whether or not such interests can be
changed legislatively after they arise.
Although some authorities have rejected the assumption that the
legislature never has the constitutional power to alter a vested right
72
-an issue which the United States Supreme Court has never clearly
resolved 73 - there has been little analysis as to the utility of the dis-
tinction between a vested and an executory or contingent interest for
the purpose of deciding whether a change in law applies retroac-
tively. 74  This author's conclusion that there is no rational basis for
the distinction 75 raises the question of alternative criteria for limiting
the power of the states to deal retroactively with existing interests.
III. A SUGGESTED CRITERION FOR DETERMINING THE
VALIDITY OF PROBATE AND PROPERTY LAW REFORM
If, in fact, the distinction between legislative and judicial action
is a distinction without a difference - serving only to create judicial
paralysis - and if the practical difference between substantive and
procedural rules, or between vested and non-vested rights, proves
illusory, what should be the appropriate criterion for determining the
constitutionally permissible mutability of a property interest? Cer-
69. See, e.g., Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 647, 91 N.E.2d 922,
924 (1950); Pruner Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 643, 162 A.2d 626, 634 (1960); see RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 372, Comment a (1944).
70. The history of the Rule Against Perpetuities makes this distinction even more untena-
ble. The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY relates that
[tihe exclusion of all interests of the conveyor and of his successors in interest (other than
remainders or executory interests) from the destructive effect of the rule against per-
petuities is a product of history. Such interests existed long prior to the development of
the rule against perpetuities; they had caused no inconveniences which aroused the ire of
either the public or the judiciary. Hence when the rule against perpetuities received its
judicial moulding, it was so moulded as not to impinge on these traditionally accepted
types of interests.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 372, Comment a (1944).
71. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
72. See, e.g., Bouquet v. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1976); note 41 supra.
73. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed, 318 S.W.2d 289, 299 (Mo. 1958) (members of class
who are to share contingent remainder of trust may be determined by statutory provisions
adopted after the death of the testator, but during the lifetime of the life tenant, because "'none
of the persons who hoped to share these trust assets . ..had any vested right thereto until the
trust terminated, [and thus] their contingent remainder did not come within the protection of
... constitutional prohibitions").
75. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
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tainly, as noted at the outset, 76 a strong argument can be made that
rules should apply retroactively in order to permit uniform and wide-
spread reform. The only countervailing consideration is the reliance
of individuals upon the continued existence of the governing princi-
ples. If the only limit on broad-reaching reforms is a recognition of
this reliance interest, the problem becomes one of defining whose
reliance should be legitimately recognized.
The reliance of the legatee or distributee does not appear to
merit consideration until such time as control of the property has
actually passed to him. Prior to the transfer of control, he is merely a
gratuitous beneficiary, receiving at best a windfall from the largesse of
another, and does not seem to have much basis to argue that he has a
reliance interest.
77
At first blush, it would seem that an assignee or purchaser for
value of the distributee's interest, who has actually changed his posi-
tion on the basis of the apparent rights of the distributee, stands on
better footing, in fact, the Heilig Trust decision, previously discussed,
appears to be based on this consideration. 7  Nevertheless, courts
have repeatedly held that those engaged in advancing present funds
to distributees entitled to a future right are, of necessity,
speculators. 79 While most of the decisions involve expectancies
rather than future rights, a strong argument can be made to require
purchasers of future rights to assume the same risk of change in the
governing rules; for unlike commercial transactions, dealings of this
76. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
77. See Norris's Estate, 329 Pa. 483, 198 A. 142 (1938). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has stated:
At law a valid transfer can be made of anything in actual existence. What the assignor has
he may dispose of. What he has not, although he may hope or expect to acquire it, he can
make no title to because he has no title himself. But such sales and assignments have been
sustained in courts of equity whenever good conscience seemed to require it, and not
otherwise ....
Id. at 493, 198 A. at 147, quoting Kuhn's Estate, 163 Pa. 438, 440, 30 A. 215, 215-16 (1894)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
78. Heilig Trust, 29 Pa. Fiduc. 265 (C.P. Phila. 1979) (denying retroactive application of
statute which would have defeated the interest of an assignee because "fundamental principles
of equity require this court to protect [the assignee's] interests as against the charities who have
not changed their positions at all"). See notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra.
79. See Norris's Estate, 329 Pa. 483, 198 A. 142 (1938). The Norris court stated that
when a mere expectancy or hope of receiving an interest or estate is the subject of a
contract of assignment, no property passes; if and when the res comes into existence the
assignee invokes the aid of a court of equity to obtain the subject of the assignment, he
must disclose a transaction that is not unconscionable or inequitable. The right to a
decree of specific performance depends on equitable considerations ....
Id. at 494, 198 A. at 148 (emphasis added).
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sort are not favored by a strong public policy. In fact, it is frequently
urged that such transactions, in view of the potential for abuse, ought
to be curbed.80
Antithetically, once the distributee actually receives control over
the property, whatever the source of his ownership, he should have
the same right to rely upon such ownership as any other owner. At
some point all rights must become indefeasible. Thus, regardless of
whether the distributee relies on the assets in his control to borrow
money, to make a purchase, or to otherwise extend himself, his rights
in the property should no longer be capable of being disturbed.
It is imperative that the reliance interest of the original donor or
property owner also be considered. As owner, he ought to be able to
assume a continuity of rules which will assure him that his gift or
estate plan will not be invalidated or substantially altered by adverse
changes in the rules of distribution after he makes his gift. Of course,
as long as the donor remains alive, any will that he has executed
remains ambulatory; thus, if there is a change in the law of wills, he
may revoke or change his will as he sees fit. As a practical matter, a
similar right continues to exist even with a gift inter vivos as long as
the donor has retained a right during his lifetime to alter, revoke, or
amend it. Although, theoretically, the retention of such power does
not make the gift ambulatory, during the period in which the donor
retains these rights, he should not have any basis for complaint about
a change in the rules regarding disposition, since he has retained the
same power as any other property owner and may adjust his gift to
meet the changes. 81 On the other hand, where the donor has re-
tained no such power, or where a testator has already died so that
any such power has died with him, a very legitimate concern exists
that his donative intention should not be thwarted by a subsequent
rule change which he neither knew of nor could have anticipated; this
concern arises regardless of whether the change is by legislative or by
judicial action.
On the other hand, not all changes in probate or property law
necessarily distort the testator's or donor's plan. Many changes which
are regarded as "procedural" have no material effect on the plan. For
example, no testator need be disturbed by the fact that an adminis-
trator is no longer required to file a bond when the value of an estate
80. See id.; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 154, Comment b (1932).
81. Cf. Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 A. 396 (1936) (under valid power of appointment,
the remoteness of the interest created by the appointment is measured by actual events -
occurring between the creation and the exercise of the power for the purpose of determining
the validity of such interest under the Rule Against Perpetuities).
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is less than $5,000.82 Moreover, a change which traditionally would
not be viewed as "procedural" may similarly have no effect on the
testator's or donor's plan. Thus, section 6104(d), the 1978 Pennsyl-
vania legislative change in the Rule Against Perpetuities, cannot and
should not be invalidated because it operates retroactively as long as
no attempt is made to apply it to an estate which has already been
distributed. Absent such an application, no possible distortion or
thwarting of the donor's or testator's plan is involved since section
6104(d) is designed to validate and preserve interests which would
have been invalid at common law.83  Indeed, the practical purpose of
the rule change was to remove possible legal frustration of the inten-
tion of the donor or testator.8 4 Certainly, no one can argue that the
donor or testator would have relied upon a rule which would have
frustrated his intention. A similar argument might be made with re-
gard to a recent judicially adopted change. In the case of Cavill Es-
tate,8 5 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held unconstitutional a
provision of the Pennsylvania Probate Code which had invalidated
gifts to charities when the operative document had been executed
within thirty days of death. 86 From the testator's standpoint, no ob-
jection could be raised to making the judicial rule apply retroactively
since its effect is to foster, not to thwart, his testamentary intention.
This is not to suggest that all problems of retroactivity will neces-
sarily be easily solved. The problem relating to what is the proper
82. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3174(d) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
83. See In re Frank, 480 Pa. 116, 389 A.2d 536 (1978); Pruner Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 162
A.2d 626 (1960); Kountz's Estate (No. 1), 213 Pa. 390, 62 A. 1103 (1906); notes 1-3 and accom-
panying text supra; note 84 infra.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Donative Transfers, Introduction to Part I,
Chapter 1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1979). In support of their adoption of the "wait-and-see" ap-
proach, the American Law Institute explained:
Most non-vested interests that conceivably might vest too remotely, so far as the rule
against perpetuities is concerned, will not in fact vest too remotely, if given an opportun-
ity to vest. Every non-vested interest that conceivably might vest too remotely could be
made valid by simply providing that such non-vested interest will take effect if, and only
if, it vests within 21 years after the death of the survivor of named lives in being on the
date the period of the rule against perpetuities begins to run. In all jurisdictions, such
non-vested interest would be valid and it would be necessary to wait and see whether the
interest in fact vests in time. In other words, the what-might-happen approach is nothing
more than a trap that is easily avoided by appropriate drafting. The adoption of the wait-
and-see approach in this Restatement is largely motivated by the equality of treatment
that is produced by placing the validity of all non-vested interests on the same plane,
whether the interest is created by a skilled draftsman or one not so skilled.
Id. at 17. For further discussion of the "wait-and-see" approach, see notes 1-3 and accompany-
ing text supra.
85. 459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 (1974).
86. Id. at 417, 329 A.2d at 506. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2507(1) (Purdon 1976)
(repealed July 9, 1976).
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time of reference for determining the applicability of the change still
remains. Is the appropriate time of reference for a will substitute,
such as a joint bank account, when the account is opened (the time at
which rights are created in the donee), or when the donor dies (the
time at which it is contemplated that the donee will enjoy his rights)?
In this regard, is there a distinction between a right exercisable im-
mediately (such as partition in the event of divorce), 87 and a right ac-
cruing on the death of a co-owner (such as survivorship)? 88
Furthermore, when a rule announces a presumed intent for
those instances where none was clearly spelled out, it will not be
entirely apparent whether the rule's cognition defeats the donor's ex-
pectations. The question of whether an adopted child or an illegiti-
mate child is within the class of intended donees would seem to fall
within this category.8 9 So, too, it would appear that questions re-
garding the permissive character of trust investments,9" the power of
the court to terminate a trust on the basis of unforeseen cir-
cumstances, 91 or the alteration of the rules of ademption by extinction
or accession, 92 might continue to trouble the courts even if the
simplified criterion of donative reliance were adopted.
Despite the above-described problems, the theory of most legis-
lative reform has been to adopt a rule more closely approximating a
testator's or donor's probable intent.9 3 Therefore, if donative re-
liance were adopted as the criterion for the appropriateness of ret-
troactive application, the test for retroactivity would coincide with the
theory of reform. 94 In this situation, no great problem should arise
in making such a reform applicable to estates which have not yet
been distributed, even though the testator may have died or the gift
may have been made before the change became operative. Certainly
this is preferable to attempting to find whether the rule is retroactive
87. See Christner v. Christner, 366 Pa. 41, 76 A.2d 361 (1950) (property held as tenancy
by entireties could be partitioned, as provided by statute, if the property was acquired after the
effective date of the statute).
88. See Bambaugh v. Bambaugh, 11 Serg. & Rawl. 190 (Pa. 1824) (statute, which provided
that all joint tenancies not partitioned during the lives of the joint tenants would descend as
tenancies in common, held to apply to joint tenancies created before the enactment of the
statute because the right of survivorship was contingent upon who died first); notes 40-46 and
accompanying text supra.
89. See In re Estate of DeRoy, 481 Pa. 403, 392 A.2d 1355 (1978); Tafel Estate, 449 Pa.
442, 296 A.2d 797 (1972); note 13 supra.
90. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301, 7302 (Purdon 1976).
91. See id. § 6102.
92. See id. § 2514(16).
93. See Tafel Estate, 449 Pa. 442, 453, 296 A.2d 797, 801 (1972) (statute requiring that
adopted children be treated equally with natural children, unless a contrary intention is appa-
rent, reflects the expectations and wishes of the reasonable man).
94. See id.
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and, if it is, whether it is "substantive or procedural" and, if "substan-
tive," whether it interferes with "vested rights." 95
Accordingly, this author concludes that a direct inquiry into
whether or not a legitimate reliance interest is being interfered with
(whether such interest is that of the donor, testator, or the donee/
distributee), would be a more realistic way of determining the wis-
dom and essential validity of a change in the law applicable to
preexisting rights. Section 6104(d) of the Pennsylvania Rule Against
Perpetuities is a perfect example of the type of reform to which this
reliance interest test should definitely apply.
95. For a discussion of these problems of characterization, see notes 38-75 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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